Abstract
Introduction
The European Union continues to change its behaviour as a global player, depending on multiple variables including resources and instruments available in each policy field, internal cohesion among member states, external constellations, and especially the role of the counterpart it is acting on. One major challenge in acting globally with a single voice is facing different situations, which make a coherent behaviour -given its complex decisional structure and the multiple actors having to reach a common denominator -even more difficult. Therefore, it is more appropriate to differentiate between and discuss scenarios of EU actorness, rather than refer to uniform attitudes in international relations.
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40 When referring to "normative power Europe" (Manners, 2002; Dietz, 2005) , several scenarios arise from its effectiveness towards specific actors, in other words, the reaction of member or third states towards the EU´s normative claims, this effectiveness being measured in what scholars more recently also describe as "Europeanization" (Börzel 2003; Hirschhausen and Patel, 2010; Radaelli, 2003) . Other scenarios could emerge from Europe´s behaviour itself.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the constructiveness of "normative power Europe" from both perspectives, pointing at internal and external challenges confronting the EU and arguing about the importance of role-assignments not only as selfattributions but also as ascriptions granted by member states or third countries. The perspective of Central and Eastern European countries seems to be even more interesting in this regard, as this region has always felt part of Europe and, on the other hand, because it still had to undergo -even more than other old member states -an adjustment process that was not without normative pressure. Following these introductory remarks, the first part of the paper will discuss the concept of "normative power Europe" introduced in the scientific and political debate by Ian Manners and Thomas Dietz (chapter 2), while in the main second part the focus will be shifted to Romania´s case, namely transitional justice discourses that may have consolidated or even challenged the construction of Europe´s normative role (chapters 3 and 4).
Constructing Normative Power Europe
Compared to other actors in the international system and especially to the USA, Europe was described in terms of military (Bull, 1982) , civilian (Duchene, 1972; Maull, 1992) and ultimately normative power (Manners, 2002; Dietz, 2005) , which corresponds to the endeavours of the EU to act in the global system as a distinctive entity with a single voice.
Considering its new form of governance, the European Union emerged as a new type of actor, being firstly described by François Duchêne (1972) as a "civilian power" with various economic and lack of military resources (cited in Manners, 2002, p. 236) . Starting from this point, political and social science scholars extended the debate to the concepts "civilising power" (Hyde-Price, 2000 cited in Niemann and June, 2011, p. 105-106 (Dietz, 2005; Manners, 2002) , and "hegemonic power" (Niemann and June, 2011, p. 114) , and adapted those to new challenges of European foreign policy. Without tracing the history of this concept, this paper focuses on Ian Manners´ (2002) and Thomas Dietz´s (2005) "normative power Europe", which is more relevant in this regard, as it emphasises the ideational aspect of norms and values.
Referring to H. Maull (1992) and K. Twitchett (1976), Manners mentions significant aspects, which mark the economic and civilian dimension of the European Union: "the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress." (Twitchett, 1976, pp. 1-2; Maull, 1990 , pp. 92-3 cited in: Manners, 2002 . The opposite perspective which Manners refers to as "empirical force" (Manners, p. 238 ) is that of "military power Europe" emphasised by Hedley Bull (1982) on the background of the Cold War (Manners, 2002, p. 237) . Manners (2002, p. 240) concludes that both "civilian and military power Europe" have been structured by the political constellation of the Cold War, also stressing the continuing weakness of the European defence policy despite its increasing institutionalization after the Cold War. Pointing out that former regimes defined themselves rather normatively and that their collapse was rather a normative than a physical one, Manners argues about the concept of "normative power Europe" described as the "ability to shape conceptions of `normal´" (Manners, 2002, p. 240) , therefore shifting the focus from institutional to cognitive, symbolic processes (Manners, 2002, pp. 239-240 ).
Significant political and institutional transformations, such as the European integration process, the eastward enlargement, and the further development of the social policy in order to overcome negative consequences of market integration have been linked to a catalogue of norms, which aim to ensure the EU´s internal and international identity. "Peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights" but also the subsequent norms "social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance" (Manners, 2002, p. 242) are included, according to Manners, in EU´s normative basis. Whether through unintentional or intentional diffusion, the European Union acts in different policy fields, using also its normative reserves. However, the specific circumstances in which the EU is able to infuse norms, considering also other normative powers, as well as the unclear (Dietz, 2005) .
Thomas Dietz (2005) draws on Manners' concept and considers "normative power" from the constructivist perspective -rather than a discourse, a more or less efficient ability to change others´ behaviours and attitudes. In his view: "`Normative power` is not an objective category […] it is a practice of discursive representation" and the main question "is not whether Europe is a normative power or not, but how it is constructed as one." (Dietz, 2005, p. 626) . He continues to argue that the European Union is engaged in a practice of "othering", constructing "the other" in order to play a normative role in relation to it. Others may be represented therefore as "existential thread", "inferior", "violating universal principles", or "different" (Dietz, 2005, p. 628 ). The EU is strengthening to each of these counterparts its corrective function. In order to avoid double standards and prescriptive attitudes, Dietz (2005) suggests, at the end, a self-reflexive approach.
The question in this regard is whether the EU can apply its practice of "othering" not only in relation to various international actors, but also within its own structures. In addition to the practice of "othering", an extensive view on the EU´s normative power role should also include attributions granted by member states and third countries. Only a mutual role attribution can validate this concept, detach it from a one-sided, unidirectional definition and therefore complete it.
However, these attributions are differentiated and gradually used by both sides. While the EU, according to Thomas Dietz (2005) , develops several forms of "otherness" to which it behaves differently, with a different degree of normativity, the addressees respond by the role attribution "normative power Europe", which they assess in relation to their self-image. Thus, the attributions by candidate-, neighbour-, and other third countries, but also among member states, would be different or at least would gradually differentiate.
On the other hand, although the EU advocates universal norms, it uses -depending on the scope for action and the profile of the addressees -a variety of norm diffusion instruments, which in turn have a gradually varying impact: Stabilization and Association Agreements, accession negotiations, development policy, diplomatic conflict resolution, or foreign trade. Actors such as Russia, the USA, the West Balkans countries or the new and old member states may respond differently to Europe´s normative aspirations. Davies (1997, p. 9) emphasise as "tidal Europe" and other scholars recently relate to as the concept of "Europeanization" (Hirschhausen and Patel, 2010) , as well as to mental maps or the spatial dimension of cognitive processes (Troebst, 2013) . "Tidal forms" of normative power are providing a more differentiated explanation for Europe´s identity constructions, considering their spatial and temporal transformations, the more or less prominent capacity or willingness to enforce this role, as well as the various reactions of the counterparts.
The European Union´s transitional justice policy
One of the most important areas in which the European Union enforces its role as a normative power is that of transitional justice.
This process includes a series of legal and institutional measures meant to ensure transition from an authoritarian, dictatorial to a democratic regime, based on human rights principles. Providing access to secret police archives, seen as a precondition for other transitional justice mechanisms, as well as lustration, trials on crimes against humanity, formation of truth commissions, and material compensation or moral rehabilitation of victims are, however, state affairs that, because of their controversy or conflict potential, are often induced by external normative pressure. Reconciliation with the past could also be initiated by various scientific, cultural or civil society communities, which do not necessarily direct public opinion towards a moral, but rather a critical examination of the past (Gyöngy, 2016 ).
The EU´s relation to Central and Eastern European countries before and even after enlargement was linked to transitional justice issues at a discursive level, rather than to concrete top-down indications focused on the entire judicial reform. Moreover, in relation with the West Balkans, the normativity of transitional justice was led to a categorical imperative, which ultimately indicates that the EU seems to be tightening its role as a normative power. In the context of accession negotiations, conditionality was extended to The main areas of transitional justice in Romania are the lustration attempts in the 1990s, the criminal prosecution and, in some cases, the conviction of communist officials, and finally the opening of the Securitate files and the foundation of the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS) (Stan, 2009) , the latter being a precondition for judicial, political, cultural, scientific, and individual coming to terms with the communist past. However, all these transitional justice areas, while being a major issue of public debate, either have failed or are lagging behind, the most advanced area being the administration of the Securitate files by CNSAS (Stan, 2009) Focused on rhetorical commitments rather than concrete judicial measures and their coherent implementation, the transitional justice process has been prolonged and rendered obsolete.
Considering the implementation deficits of transitional justice in Romania, also emphasised by various scientific endeavours (Gyöngy 2016; Stan, 2009; Trappe, 2009) The "return to Europe"-a paradigm emphasised by Central and Eastern European countries after the end of communism and, in this respect, the return to European democratic principles was highlighted in particular by emerging civil society groups. Newly founded political and cultural organizations were steeped in this idea. ‡ ‡ Society´s claim to transitional justice was not limited to the Romanian state either, but was discursively linked to Europe; this intended to put the Romanian state under normative pressure. Nevertheless, these discourses had to confront nationalistic tendencies often turned against Europe´s norm infusion (Marino, 1996, chapter IV) .
Nonetheless, the return to European democratic values was explicitly declared in the Proclamation of Timișoara (1990) , the first document claiming transitional justice and, in particular, lustration (Art. 8), a document created by Timișoara´s civil society and former protesters (Stan, 2009) . Beyond lustration, which ultimately could not be achieved, this document clearly reflects openness towards Western Europe, without claiming to imitate it.
Entering the "House of Europe" -one could recognise M. Gorbachev´s concept -is linked to a learning process based on values of tolerance, "European" democracy, dialogue and (Gyöngy, 2016; Stan, 2009 This statement indicates that a European communicative framework can promote exchanges and mutual learning among the countries concerned, thereby allowing the intentional or unintentional, "informational" or "procedural" (Manners, 2002, pp. 244-245) diffusion of European norms. The constructed "other", in the words of Thomas Dietz (2005) , is thus gradually incorporated into a common "self", not without changing it.
Conclusion
The finally hampered an "elite replacement", leaving room for "elite reproduction" (Stan, 2009, pp. 147-148) . Another reason for this hesitant attitude towards transitional justice is closely related to the emergence and cohesion difficulties faced by the civil society during and after the communist regime, a civil society that would have had the ability to guide the regime change and the post-communist transition in a much more coherent way.
However, "normative power Europe" envisaging principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, to mention just a few, has been linked to transitional justice in Central At discursive level, normative pressure regarding concrete transitional justice measures was played off by oppositional or civil society groups against the old-new political elites, while later, at the time of accession, it was taken over even by the political leaders.
Tidal forms of "normative power Europe" can be noticed even more recently in the programmatic strengthening of the EU´s role in this field. The transitional justice policy is now directly related not only to the enlargement policy, but also to conflict resolution and peace building (EU´s Policy Framework, 2015) , precisely because the current political situation in the new neighbouring and accession countries could escalate into new conflicts, while the normative power of the communist regime in East-Central Europe at the time no longer presented any conflict potential, but still belonged to a "constructed other".
